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Igor Gretskiy Ukraine 's accession to NATO is discussed nowadays. Media gives us a plenty of comments and publications on this issue. Politicians and statesmen appear on TV screens, sharing with publicity their views concerning the Ukraine 's possibility to join NATO. President of Poland , Leh Kachinsky said that Ukraine will join NATO in the year 2008 . Inside the Ukrainian society this issue is being discussed very long time, and still there is no concensus upon it. This article tries to analyse the possibility of Ukraine 's accession to NATO within a given frame and makes a survey of the situation around this issue. Ukrainian society and its attitude towards accession to NATO By December 2005, almost all political parties of Ukraine , aspiring to take part in the parliamental elections of 2006, defined their programs. The majority of these documents contains points concerning how the relations between Ukraine and NATO should be transformed. President Yuschenko is known as the most ardent advocate of Ukraine 's accession to NATO. He is supported by the politcal block “Our Ukraine”. Such political powers as Communist party of Ukraine , left-wing political blocks “Ne Tak!” and “People's opposition” are against the Ukraine 's membership in NATO. Programs of Socialist Party and Party of Regions are looking like neutral concerning the issue of Ukraine 's accession to NATO. Socialists claims that the issue of Ukraine 's membership in the Alliance should be solved through a referendum procedure. Party of Regions proclaims equal cooperation with Russia , USA and EU, but it also supports “further development of relations between NATO and Ukraine for a fully fledged membership of Ukraine in the European security system.” Still, Party of Regions looks very sceptical concerning the Ukraine 's accession to NATO and its members often resort to help of anti-NATO rhethorics . The Manifesto of Justice – a program document of the block of Yulia Timoshenko – is devoted to issues of the Ukrainian domestic policy, and NATO is not mentioned there. In Yulia Timoshenko's interviews the topic of Ukraine 's membership in NATO is touched very cautiosly. She considers that there is no need to hurry on the way to NATO . Therefore, the political elites do not have a unique strategic perspective for Ukraine . Nor does the Ukrainian society . Moreover, the idea of Ukraine 's accession to NATO is shared by 12% of Ukrainians . In fact, this figure may be greater. But it is doubtful that the Ukraine 's accession to NATO can be supported by the half of population. The referendum: to be or not to be For those who are in favour of Ukraine 's membership in NATO, there is a question whether to use a referendum procedure or not. The surrounding of president Yuschenko is not likely to hold a referendum on this issue. For instance, Minister of Defense, Mr. Anatoly Grytsenko, while negotiating with his colleague from Hungary , Mr. Ferenz Juhas, stated that there is no need to hold a referendum in Ukraine . If this referendum was held today, it would be lost for those politicians who strive for NATO. As Yulia Tymoshenko told in her interview, NATO does not have attractive image today . Mainly, this problem is solved in the auspicies of the Action Plan Ukraine-NATO and State program for public information on the issues of Euro-Atlantic integration for 2004-2007 . It provides the executive branch of Ukraine with instruments needed to change public opinion on the issue of Ukraine 's accession to NATO. Arguments for and against accession to NATO Speaking about the potential possibility of Ukraine to join NATO, the speaker of Verkhovna Rada, Mr. Volodymyr Lytvin noted that Ukraine should know what it will loose and what it will gain before taking the decision to enter NATO . So, what are the advantages and disadvantages of Ukraine 's membership in NATO? A membership of Ukraine in NATO is often linked with a membership in the European Union and presented as a virtue. This logic is not clear enough, cause there are examples of Norway , Iceland , Turkey , USA , Canada , Romania , Bulgaria – these countries are members of NATO, and they do not belong to the European Union. Therefore, NATO membership does not guarantee a place in the European Union. The supporters of Ukraine 's accession to NATO claims that NATO membership would help Ukraine to fight against terrorism more effectively . This assertion seems to be very doubtful, cause for the time being NATO did not proved it has effective instruments for fighting against terrorism, and it was proved by the tragedy in Madrid – on March 11, 2004 . Terrorism is not the only threat to Ukraine and the European security. Mr. Kryuchkov, the Head of National Security and Defense Committee of the Verkhovna Rada, supposes that the greatest threats for Ukrainian security are the domestic problems . Indeed, the source of challenges for sovereignity and security of Ukraine is not only a terrorrist threat. The security system could be jeopardized by corruption of statesmen, citizens' poverty, industrial stagnation, low financial support of the armed forces. It's very difficult, of course, for a single state to respond effectively every challenge to its security . Nevertheless, external threat has less chances to harm the society, if this society is prosperous and stable. Vyktor Medvedchuk, the leader of the Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine, considers that if Ukraine joins NATO, it will loose two millions of jobs and an opportunity to produce weapons in cooperation with Russia . This statement sounds exaggerated – Russia would not give up cooperating with Ukraine , if this cooperation is economically proved. Position of the Ukrainian military leadership For the military circles of Ukraine , the issue of Ukraine-NATO relations is extremely important. It is an issue of the further development of the Ukrainian armed forces. Today, the Ukrainian armed forces are in deep crisis. Ukrainian government tries to overcome it, but it does not have sufficient budget for it. Annual military expenditures of Ukraine 1,65% of its GDP. Comparing with a 2% norm for the members of NATO, Ukrainian expenditures on defense look insufficiant. The government is trying to reform the army, decreasing the total number of military men and increasing the volume of investments. During the year 2005 the salary for military men was trippled and reached 300 grivnas (50 USD). Moreover, the Ukraine 's military leadership decrease the unprofitable military production. In 2004 there were 63 unprofitable factories, in 2005 – there were just 35 . Still, it is not enough to enter NATO by 2008. There is an assumption that the process of accession to NATO will cost Ukraine approximately 20 billion of US dollars . The Ukrainian economics would be extremely hard to overcome this figure. Taking into consideration increased gaz prices – this aim becomes unfulfilled. Conclusion Firstly, the Ukrainian political elite is aspiring to enter NATO formally as soon as possible, setting aside the consistency of a NATO membership. Economic criteria of membership in NATO are elusive and fuzzy , and easily could be negglected by the Ukrainian government. In this case, the issue of the Ukraine 's accession to NATO can be solved by a political will of the Ukrainian elites. Secondly, the issue of Ukraine 's accession to NATO is artificially boosted and exagerrated in media. The discourse around this topic helps to earn political assets for parties of Ukraine before the parliamentary elections 2006. Those paries who in favour of Ukraine 's accession to NATO attract people with advertizing Westen values and living standards. The parties, opposing to this idea, convince potential electorate with patriotic and nationalist rhethorics, setting NATO against Russia sometimes. Thirdly, the political struggle around the NATO's image in Ukraine will continue till the end of the parliamentary elections 2006, at least. Perceptions and expectations from the potential Ukraine 's accession to NATO are exaggerated. That shows what a significant role belongs to media in debates around this issue, increasing an informational pressure on electorate. The discource and arguments of the opposing party look very aggressive, and the position of the Ukraine 's accession advocates has a lack of exactness and explanation. Fourthly, in the beginning of the XXI century Ukraine faced with a sharp need for structural reforms. The Ukraine 's accession to NATO will be failed without an increase of living standards in Ukraine – without deep economic, political and social structural reforms.
RBC News, February 8, 2006 // http://top.rbc.ru/index.shtml?/news/daythemes/2006/02/08/08070208_bod.shtml SECURITY IN THE EURO-ATLANTIC AREA AFTER THE COLD WAR Kadi Silde Both the security environment of the Euro-Atlantic area, the challenges and the solutions to them have been changing since the end of the Cold War. In this essay, I will see, how threat perceptions have changed and how major actors in the area have responded to these alterations. I will argue that although traditional security risks and military means are still important, both the problems and the solutions have altered themselves. In the end, I will give some extra attention to the Ukraine and Russia and their part in the Euro-Atlantic security structures. The concept of security is one of the most debated in international relations. However, reconceptualising security is no longer just an academic exercise. For example, whereas academics have long rallied for paying more attention (and resources) to dealing with soft security issues, during the Cold War, policy-makers were too busy with nuclear threats to really act in a similar manner. The end of the Cold War has brought a change – no longer are traditional security risks perceived as the only or even the main problems of states and their inhabitants. Military threats have changed their nature considerably and dealing with a whole range of new (softer) threats is seen as essential to states and their inhabitants as well. Military aggression by another state is no longer the main threat most states in the Euro-Atlantic area perceive to be most dangerous to their security. Of much higher importance are asymmetrical threats, such as terrorism, cyber warfare, illegal immigration, organized trans-border crime (e.g. drug trafficking), etc. More and more issues, once not even considered security risks (such as economic, energy-related and environmental questions) are making their way to the agendas of governments` security organs and organisations dealing with security. Intra-state conflicts stemming from national or religious tensions (in some cases even leading up to failed states) are far more probable and feared than traditional warfare. In other words, the security environment has gone through numerous fundamental changes. So has the security structure of the Euro-Atlantic area. Firstly, the character of and relationship between different security guarantors has changed. The character of NATO as the traditional guarantor of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area has been through big changes. Due to the alteration of the security environment brought about after the collapse of the Soviet block, NATO had rendered itself irrelevant in the eyes of some. Although it is true that the organization has been through many crises since then, it has remained viable in my view by adapting to the new situation NATO is no longer a traditional alliance with collective security as its main task. It is now developing means to deal with new threats, including more and more civilian problems. It is also sharing some military tasks it has. The relationship between NATO and the EU deserves attention here. Most of NATO's European member states are also in the EU – therefore the question of the relationship between the EU and NATO is not an issue of another partnership, it is a question of the main foundations of the Alliance itself. For example, to meet the demands of the changing strategic environment, NATO's forces are in the process of transformation to add versatility and mobility. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is one of the most important changes – as an effective tool and as an example of and catalyst for transformation. The cooperation with the EU is very important in this field. Firstly, the development of NRF and European Rapid Reaction Force needs to be complementary. Secondly, the EU has control of a wider range of instruments and can therefore be very useful for NATO as it makes it possible for the organization to move further and take on more complex operations since the EU is taking responsibility for less intensive operations. NATO is no longer just a military organisation and the EU is moving away from being a political dwarf (taking into account developments in the European foreign, security and defence policy) – they are converging in a sense. However, NATO is still the prevalent organization for countering military threats in the area. Still, the division of labour has changed to a certain extent, proof of that being the EU overtaking NATO and UN missions. However, despite certain convergence, transatlantic relations have gone through more problems than ever since the end of World War II. Schroder claimed that the transatlantic relationship now evolves without the framework of the Alliance . Although perhaps exaggerated, this threat has to be dealt with. Downscaling the trans-Atlantic relationship to the level of EU-US would bring with it a considerable loss since NATO is not just a sum of member states but has added value to it. Also a more visible threat – the competitiveness of NATO and European Security and Defence Policy - has to be dealt with. That is a question of how far the autonomy of the former should go. Right now European Security and Defence Policy relies heavily on NATO assets (Berlin Plus arrangements). If that were to be radically changed, duplication (and the other two infamous D-s) would likely follow. Given the tremendous security challenges, limited resources and the potential for complementarities in EU-NATO relations, this needs to be prevented. Another very important change in the Euro-Atlantic security structures is “going out of area”. It is no longer sufficient or even possible to divide the security of the states with a formal membership in NATO and EU and other countries – the world is too interdependent. Cooperation with partner countries in Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Partnership for Peace programs and through various other mechanisms, such as the NATO-Russia Council, NATO-Ukraine Council, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as missions going further and further from NATO territory, are essential in assuring security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Of equal significance are European Neighbourhood Policy and EU out-of-area missions. It is important that NATO and the EU are proactively inclusive to ensure that these countries choose the right path and/or have access to their capabilities. Of special importance are Russia (due to its huge potential, both positive and negative) and the Ukraine (as in case of success, it could be an example for other countries, for example Russia and Belarus ). In the case of Russia and the Ukraine , although they do not have a vote in NATO, in the NATO-Russia Council and NATO-Ukraine Commission they are equal partners. The EU also plays an important role in influencing them. The relationship between Russia and NATO has been more strained than the one between the EU and Russia and therefore it can influence Russia better in some cases. Russia is at a very decisive point right now – to make sure that it leans in the way of democracy it therefore has to be engaged by both the EU and NATO. Potential membership is known to be a very strong motivation for reform – in the Ukraine , membership in the EU has been perceived more desirable than in NATO. However, NATO has shown more willingness to offer its membership than the EU. Especially considering the uncertainty in the EU now, turning the Ukraine into a democratic and successful country requires much more attention than it could get from the EU only. As already mentioned, the significance of the Ukraine to Euro-Atlantic security lies not only in the size of the country but also in its potential of being an example of successful post-soviet transformation. With the higher complexity of the security environment, responses are also becoming more complex – incorporating different elements from military and civilian fields while taking up tasks further and further away from the Euro-Atlantic Area itself. In order to be able to tackle these challenges successfully, Euro-Atlantic security structures need to be as cooperative and inclusive as possible. Cooperation between NATO and the EU is essential, as well as including countries not covered by formal membership (such as Russia and the Ukraine ).
NATO'S THREATS AND EFFECTIVENESS Inga Dudko Up until the fall of communism, NATO was able to focus on the one and only significant enemy and, thus, clearly saw the line that separated the good from the bad. Today, it is not as easy to focus on today's multidimensional "enemy". There is no separating line: the enemy exists not only in NATO's external environment and periphery, but also inside its home territory; it is a less lethal enemy, but it is one that is more pervasive and difficult to deter. Threats are both, internal and external. NATO's members can be attacked at any time by external forces. This gives justification to Article V concerns and operations. Some old problems remain, and many new ones have emerged. Article V concerns exist today in NATO's Southeast region due to possible conflicts between Iraq and Turkey, Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, or Turkey and Greece over other issues. Additionally, the Alliance is concerned about "internal" terrorism, the rising fear of transnational crime, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, NATO is probably more concerned with many non-Article V potential threats and operations, ranging from the Alliance 's periphery to its external areas. In its periphery (i.e. neighboring areas), the Alliance worries about North Africa (especially Algeria ), and it is involved in peace keeping in the Balkans. There are concerns, too, about nearby countries and whatever comes with the expansion of NATO. NATO's partnership building with non-member countries through various institutions, e.g. Partnership for Peace (PfP), improves the organization's strategic reach but, at the same time, it imports their substantial problems. In its external area (i.e. non-neighboring areas), the Alliance is concerned with Russia 's struggle for development, the possible induction of new members, and its relations with emerging and evolving institutions. Moreover, the Caspian Sea area with its significant oil reserves and its proximity to Turkey , undoubtedly vital for Europe 's future, concern NATO more than ever. Another area of concern is the vast Sub-Saharan region which, due to competing interests, may cause friction between Europeans and Americans, with damaging effects for the Alliance . Similarly, NATO may be divided over Middle East issues since, as the EU acquires more power, European and American interests in the region may diverge even more.
NATO ' s Threats Environments
Additional NATO Threats
Two realities speak in favor of NATO's effectiveness: its history in preventing the unthinkable and its current successful operations. It is likely that NATO effectiveness varies with the number of members (Optimum Alliance Size), the criteria for member selection (Minimization of Adverse Selection), the establishment of disincentives for members' risky behavior (Minimization of Moral Hazard), and the equitable distribution of burdens (Minimization of Free Riding). OPTIMUM ALLIANCE S IZE To what extent can NATO preserve sustainable cooperation among its members? Can such cooperation be jeopardized with the addition of new members? Is there an optimum Alliance size? Since its inception NATO's expansion path has been controversial. But most would agree about its overall success and that even more security gains are likely possible ADVERSE SELECTION Since many non-members have applied or plan to apply for membership, NATO has to be careful with its selection process. Like an insurance company, the Alliance has to minimize adverse selection, and if possible, avoid bad risks. Adverse selection arises because of the Alliance 's inability to accurately distinguish between high- and low- risk new members. Currently, the organization attempts to minimize adverse selection by dividing prospective members into two groups: (1) those who satisfy a certain number of entry criteria and, (2) those who do not yet satisfy all such criteria. Prospective members of the first group are encouraged to apply for full membership. Those of the second group are encouraged to participate in the Alliance as associate members through institutions such as PfP [1]. MORAL HAZARD The problem of Moral Hazard occurs when allies undertake risky action after they become full members. For instance, because a member country is under NATO's protection umbrella, it may act in a more provocative or aggressive manner than if it were on its own. FREE RIDING Additionally, NATO's effectiveness depends on whether or not burdens are distributed equitably. As the concerns of the Alliance extend from its internal to its peripheral and external environments, all members are expected to add value to Article V-type defense capacity. Additionally, they will have to think more as security providers rather than security consumers. The Alliance brings security to old and new members but it requires equitable and credible commitments from all. From each country according to its transparent vital interests and competitive or comparative advantage to each according to its transparent needs would be more appropriate for the maximization of collective security/defense and the minimization of free riding. Bibliography 1.Kugler, R. And Vanderbeek, T., "Where is NATO's Defense Posture Headed?", Strategic Forum, National Defense University , Institute for National Strategic Studies, ¹ 133.
NATO AND FUTURE OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATIONS O. Zhuravlov In recent years the role of NATO as an international actor has risen dramatically . As we can see NATO has the tendecy of getting the status of not only a military alliance , but of a global organisation with different vectors of activity - from preventing military intrusion of its members to solving ecological , socio and economic problems in different regions of the world. While expanding to t he East, NATO may influence the international relations that are beyond the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation. In my opinion, it's difficult to overestimate the function of NATO in the Euroatlantic region. I'm definitely sure that after dissolving of The Warsaw Pact in 1991 NATO's historic mission is to be the mechanism to give a new coil of development in Europe , and it makes NATO a political organisation rather than a military one. The followed Partnership for Peace programme gave the chance for several eastern European countries to change the way of their development. It was the programme that provided Eastern Europe with a new vector of policy: it allowed the countries such as Czech Republic , Poland , Hungary and the others to join NATO and EU. An integral part of the North Atlantic cooperation is the dialogue between the two largest European countries - Russia and Ukraine . The majority of people in these countries tend to keep Cold War stereotypes and see NATO as a threat. as they lack objective information from the government. NATO has changed greatly since Cold War and the relations can only be based on pragmatic cooperation. But the politician should be tolerant and understanding, promoting the policy of North Atlantic integration. Of course there are some tricky issues in the history of NATO , such as military conflict in Yugoslavia , that entailed human victims and caused a general public resonance . Not taking into account political predilections such conflicts should only be overcome through diplomatic negotiations. And as I've mentioned NATO is growing to be a Global peacemaker, I see its future in using wise and deliberate diplomacy. Only in such cases it will guarantee safety in Euro Atlantic region. And there are some talented and qualified specialists in Europe today. Another point I'd like to dwell on is the relations between NATO and the European Union. Some experts are inclined to belive that NATO and EU are the main rivals in Europe . At the same time efforts of the European union are very often considered in a context of opposition to NATO and desire of the Europeans to carry out their own policy within the vital issues. Both these structures should cooperate undoubtedly to provide the Euroatlantic region with safety and stability. To operate effectively both EU and NATO should resolve those problems which correspond to the organization structure. Thus problems of social and economic character should become number one priority for the EU whereas safety and defense issues should be of highest importance for NATO as both organizations evidently have advantages in these areas compared to each other.. In conclusion I'd like to say that under the condition of terrorism and uncontrolled usage of nuclear weapon, birds' flu and ecological pollution such things as safety and stability get special value. The only obvious thing is that we should take the man first and unite to achieve the goal.
Zbigniew Cierpinski The Republic of Moldova has highly complicated ethnic, religious and linguistic structure. This, as well as complicated geopolitical location was a reason of many conflicts in this country, including short but bloody war in Transnistria. Although in Moldova there is no war today, there is unfortunately no peace. A considerable obstacle for normalisation of the situation remains problems with withdrawal of the rest of the former Soviet 14 th Army that stationed in Moldova since it was a part of the Soviet Union . At the moment in Transnistria there serve an OSCE observation mission and peacekeeping forces of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Moldova and Transnistria agreed to their presence there during CIS summit in July 1992 in Moscow . Unfortunately, although the peacekeeping mission of CIS has some achievements, 13 years later the Republic of Moldova is still divided, Transnistria is still a possible threat to stability in the region and the future of the whole country remains obscure. Of course the lack of stability in Moldova is not only Russia 's or CIS fault. Nevertheless it seems clear, that to defeat the deadlock in peace process it may be necessary to involve some new actors. Probably that is why neither Moldova nor Ukraine oppose to participation in peace negotiations regarding Transnistria the EU, NATO and the USA . On the other hand, Russia is reluctant to agree to invite new sides to solving the Transnistrian knot. Although Wade Boese of the Arms Control Association admitts that delays in withdrawig Russian troops from Moldova have its financial aspects he is convinced it is rather a matter of pride and the concern that when Russia leaves [Georgia and Moldova], NATO or United States forces may replace them . In that context it is clear, that it is incorrect to compare Transnistria with a Russian knife in the back of Ukraine or to consider Transnistria as a Russian base in Balkan direction . Transnistria has of course its geostrategic and geopolitical value. But the geopolitical purpose of Transnistria is not to control Balkans or to threaten Ukraine , but rather to control the rest of the Republic of Moldova . Participation of regional organisations like OSCE, CIS but also NATO and the EU in conflict settlement could be pofitable and even more efficeint than for example standard UN missions. Also Russian scientists stress, that in conflict settlement and peacekeeping missions regional organisations are often able to play important and positive role. It is possible especially when they posess their own infrastructure and considerable resources. They are sometimes more interested in conflict settlement and more efficient even than the UN , probably because their own members' security is at stake. That is also why the situaton in Moldova is so interesting not only for CIS but also for its new neighbours –NATO and shortly – probably since 2007 – the EU. The 1999-adapted CFE and the Istanbul Commitments are twin parts of the package approved at the 1999 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Istanbul summit. They required Russia (among other things) to completely remove Russian forces from Moldova by 2002 . For the meantime, in Transnistria there is still stocked more than 19 000 tones of ex-soviet military equipment and ammunition. But the constant delays in withdrawal of Russian troops are presumably not only caused by considerable amounts of weapons and ammunition stocked in Transnistria. Exept Moscow, there is another side interested in presence of Russian troops in transnistria – the Transnistrian authorities. President of the self-proclaimed so-called Moldovan Transnistrian Republic , Igor Smirnov, knows that as long Russian troops stay in Transnistria, the independence of Transnistria is relatively safe. This situation is also profitable for the Kremlin. It often use Tiraspol 's disargeement for Russian withdrawal from Transnistria as an excuse for delays adopting the Istanbul Commitments. Wade Boese of the Arms Control Association even said it was simply unbelievable that obstacles in Moldova were too steep for Russia to overcome. I think it's somewhat complicit in its own blackmail -- and here I'm speaking about Russia, in the sense that if it really wanted to resolve these issues, it probably could , he said . Also the spokesman for the OSCE in Moldova , Klaus Neukirch, says the withdrawal of the ammunition -- if it went ahead without any technical problems and without any delay -- could be done within approximately five months . Finally, there is also one more (maybe even the most important) reason for such reluctant withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria. The withdrawal became a hostage of another, separate problem. Namely, Russians and NATO play a tricky game, trying to link withdrawal from Transnistria with the problem of Lithuania 's, Latvia 's and Estonia 's access to CFE treaty . Thus, most likeable reason for such delays remains lack of political will of Russian authorities. Moreover, Moscow , trying to preserve its own military presence in Moldova tries to use various excuses as "guaranteeing stability," job-creation for local residents, secessionist authorities' objections to troop withdrawal, lack of accommodation in Russia for withdrawn troops or just "peacekeeping" . Newertheless , Moldova would rather welcome replacing the Russian “peacekeepers” with an truly international force . Those Moldovans who are opposed to the Russian presence in their country say Moscow wants to keep its forces in Transdniester in order to bolster up the pro-Moscow separatist region in Tiraspol . They also say Moscow wants to have a western base that could allow to counter NATO's next eastward enlargements . Nevertheless it is obvious, that the Kremlin can feel itself unsafe, if near Russian-NATO northern flank there remains zone where arrangements of the CFE Treaty are not applied. This is why Russian Federation wants to hurry the CFE treaty's ratification, hoping that it might set limits to forces that the allies might introduce in the Baltic states if they find it necessary . When withdrawal is so complicated, maybe it would be easier if Russia just left Transnistrian stockpiles behind? But even if Moscov agreed for such concession, Moldova does not want Russia simply to abandon dengerous the stockpiles. The reason is simple: the weapon would likely fall under control of separatist tiraspol regime, led by ethnic Russians . It would be rather more realistic do destroy the remaining weapon and equipment. Being a NATO partner since 1994, Moldowa already receives NATO help in programs of safe destruction of the country's stockpile of 12,000 landmines and 700 tonnes of surplus munitions and rocket fuel . An interesting example of cooperation of an “old” and “new” neighbour in stabilizing situation in conflict region is an increasing involvement of Ukraine and the EU in Transnistrian conflict settlement. After 2007 the will be a close neighbour (via Romanian-Moldovan border) to the conflict zone and that is why already now the EU is trying to positive influence the situation in its future neighbourhood. On the other hand, despite a cold beginning in relations between Moldova and Ukraine in early 90's it is clear, that Ukraine plays a positive and important role in peace process in Transnistria. An important exapmple of positive influence of Kiev on peace negotiations in Transnistria is the president's Yushchenko's conflict-settlement plan for Transnistria. Since December 2005 on Moldovan-Ukrainian border there works an observation mission of the EU. It was a special request of Moldovan government, blaming regime in Tyraspol for illegal weapon and drugs trafficking. The goal of the mission is not only to monitor the situation on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, but also to provide advice and training for Moldovan and Ukrainian border guards and custom services to increase their professional skills. The EU border assistance mission in Moldova has two-year mandate, which can be extended. Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko has given the EU border mission his full backing. The EU mission's limited budget of 8 million EUR will only allow it to train and instruct Moldovan and Ukrainian personnel, but at the 7 October ceremony at Palanca, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk said "We hope that the mission will not only conduct border monitoring, but also provide practical assistance in development of border infrastructure" . Although it is still a long way to the end of the Transnistrian conflict, it seems, that involvement of NATO, EU and Ukraine can provide a new incentive for peace process in Republic of Moldowa . If the price for peace and unity of Moldova will be agreement of NATO for CFE limitations for Lithuania , Latvia and Estonia in armaments, it is price worth to be paid. That way Russia would gain more comfortable and forseeable situation in Pribaltika and NATO and EU – stable neighbourhood of reunited Moldova , responsible for its whole territory and able to cooperate with CIS but also with the West. An additional advantage derived from solving Transnistrian knot with additional involvement of NATO, the EU and Ukraine would be stronger cooperation between Kyiv and Brusseles.
Russians explain, they simply do not have enough money to build new facilities for returning troops and weapons.
NEW CHALLENGES TO ATLANTIC RELATIONS: ALTERATION OF THE CONCEPT - SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND Sofiya Fedyna This year NATO is going to celebrate its 57 anniversary. Alliance was created as a military and political Union to provide collective defense from any aggression manifestation and to create and to promote the security environment for economic growth and development of democracy in Europe . Membership in NATO guaranteed some kind of stability in relations among them, and at the same time it favored the minimization of the conflicts in this region. As it was stated in the North Atlantic Treaty, “ the parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force… ” During the Cold War, when NATO was one of the two parties of global confrontation, its objectives and functions were sharply defined – not to give the possibility to communist threat to expand on the territory of Western European countries, to promote stability and security in that region. But with the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Organization ended their existence, and NATO survived, new questions appeared: What it should do further? May be NATO has completed its task in Human's history and should end up its existence? What are the new objectives and tasks it can overtake? What should be a new model of relations? Situation was complicated with that that with the end of the Cold War, with the end of the global confrontation of the two blocks, the problems in the Euro Atlantic region has not disappeared, but vice versa has become more complicated. One global conflict was replaced by a numerous local conflicts and crisis, which became sensitive points for all the countries. So the main question was: do we need to create a new organization to deal with this problems or NATO can be transformed in order to respond for the new challenges. The preference was given to NATO. Taking into account the new challenges NATO began its evolution from the Union with precisely outlined responsibility for collective defense to Organization that has become a center of development of partnership relations among the countries that cooperate closely within the security question but with the much more wide context. Here we can emphasize several aspects: First: the alteration of activity format and the extension of the tasks. The largest and the most important change in the NATO's activity since the Cold Was times has become the participation of the Alliance in the conflict resolution process, re-establishment of peace and ensuring of stability in a crisis regions. The most important is that if earlier NATO activity was directed towards the elimination of threats that endangered directly only the countries of North Atlantic region, then now the activity sphere of Alliance in the diversity of its new functions is almost unlimited No less important is the NATO transformation in the geographic context. The founding Treaty stated that the members of NATO are or could be the countries of North Atlantic regions. For the Cold War times these limits were justifiable as they were the limits of division line of the then Europe . With the end of this global confrontation it has become absolutely groundlessly to outline as the zone of democracy only the above stated region. Accordingly, the Council of North Atlantic Partnership was transformed into the Council of Euro Atlantic Partnership that foresaw the extended format of the European countries participation in the Alliance and meant also the possibility of the broadening of the influence sphere and cooperation of NATO onto other countries of Euro Atlantic region. The next important initiative was the implementation of the Partnership For Peace program, that made even further extension of NATO friendly –countries and gave them a chance to take part in the process of establishment and maintenance of peace on the basis of democracy. After the terrorist attacks on the USA on the 9/11/2001 peace making operations of the Alliance and its unique ability to resolve crisis situations has been furthermore improved and have achieved more importance to international security. As it was stated by the former Secretary General of NATO Lord Robertson: “…in case of emergence of new crisis situations that could influence the situation in Euro Atlantic region, the allies again can take advantage of the Alliance as an international instrument of crisis situations resolution”. The policy of NATO towards the crisis resolution after the end of the Cold War has adjusted to radically new type of risks that it faces nowadays. It is based on three mutually complementary elements: dialog, cooperation with other countries and retention of collective defense ability of NATO . Every of these elements is to provide peaceful prevention or resolution of crisis situations that can endanger security of Euro Atlantic region. In a modern world the role of the Alliance as of the factor that promotes peace maintenance and particularly contributes to the resolution of crisis and conflict situations, rises sharply. And not because the situation in the world aggravates, but because the effectiveness of NATO gives us a hope that the similar problems will not arise in the nearest future. • One note – it is a peace through military force. That is the distinction between the NATO approach, and in particular the USA one, as a NATO informal leader, to the conflict resolution and European approach. NATO of course is a military structure and the major approach to security maintenance it sees in a number of military, modern arms supplies and in the possibility to respond to modern challenges with force. And to me it seems logical to develop the other aspect of transatlantic relations. In its examination I will refer to the position of USA , as of informal NATO leader, whose policy in a definite questions determines the way of Alliance existence. So, second: NATO – EU relations, precisely USA – EU relations. In this context we also could have seen that a new questions arise. NATO is the Organization of North Atlantic Treaty and among its members besides the North American countries are the countries of Europe . At the same time the European countries, NATO members, were involved into active policy making within the European Union that has been changing its format since the Cold War times. As the division line in Europe has disappeared, the EU began the elaboration of Common Security and Defense Policy and that lead to the transformation of the EU into the one of major global players on the international arena. After tragic 9/11/2001 is had become clearly understandable that transatlantic relations will no longer be the same in our political understanding and thoughts as it has been before. But now it has come the high time to understand how different are the Europe and the USA , especially in the security approach. A close view on these questions shows us not very pleasant picture: the USA and the main European countries have a growing number of misunderstandings and what furthermore they disagree upon the definition of the main threats and especially upon the strategies of their resolution. So the consequences are the following, and not really pleasant: • The modern crisis in transatlantic relations can not be resolved so easily as the dust can be dispersed upon the Iraq deserts during the crisis. • The European countries will not anymore be obedient followers. That is the reason why the confrontations and competition in transatlantic relations will tend to increase. That had been witnessed by the difference in the position of NATO countries while taking a decision whether or not sent their troops to Iraq – many of the countries had not supported the initiative, some of them stayed neutral. • The USA are really strong in the military issues, but in the main aspects of international relations they become more and more dependant on Europe – especially on the Europe's ability to use peaceful means of conflict resolution, so called “soft powers” • Europe is much stronger, more influential and potentially more successful than it is now commented. Speaking with one voice and uniting all its efforts ( in the definite situation – efforts of 25 countries) for the definite objective – there is a huge possibility to achieve what is needed • And the main difference between the EU and the USA is that for the USA the resolution of the problem is more important regardless of the mechanisms of its settlement. At the same time Europeans pay more attention to the conformity of the procedure, such as a law framework provided by the UN. Europeans are much more tolerant to the mistakes and more patient while waiting for the results. They will better turn to the peaceful means of dispute resolution as a negotiations, diplomacy than turn to the use of force, and they will rather appeal to the international law, conventions and to the response of the international community to find the most objective decision to the problem. What is the condition of the transatlantic relations nowadays? First of all, the approaches to the security question of the USA and Europe are completely different. The USA define the security question through the military prism. The only superpower that is now in the world, is ready to use force and to oppose on its own the new challenges every time, when it seems to be needed for the sake of its security and protection of national interests, often ignoring the position of international society. But the most important is the fact that the USA pay little attention to the international organizations, multilateral diplomacy and international law. On the one hand it gives the USA some status of superpower that is undefeatable, but on the other hand such a position poses a threat to the countries that support the USA : though R.Kagan argues that the biggest problem has a superpower, to my point of view the tension influences first of all the ally countries of the superpower. They can be much easier infringed. In contradiction to the USA , the European countries try to implement the multilateral approach in their external relations, at the basis of cooperation and mutual understanding. Europe is much stronger, that many American neo-conservators think. Europe predominates there, where America is weak. Just let us recall about such a measures as a nation building, transition period management, peacemaking, monitoring, creation of the legal basis for multilateral action. Never before has the Europe been so strong, prosperous and at the same free as it is now. At the moment Europe is one of the global players and it has to be ready to divide the responsibility for global security and the creation of better world. And one more thing: it is important not to forget that in the world there are not so many problems that can be resolved by one country on its own. International cooperation in really needed today, especially in the international security sector. Nowadays, security is a prerequisite of development. What do we have now? At present moment NATO and other European countries create unique transatlantic commonwealth, that encompasses political, economic and security issues. Its framework is the community of interests, and the community of fundamental principles of cooperation and co-existence, along with the mutual support. Of course not all the questions could be resolved easily, so that here we can see the main task for the Alliance in transatlantic relations: to promote the conducting of consultations and discussions, achievement of understanding and consensus. And here is no reason for pessimism: transatlantic relations will differ but obviously they will not become less important and less effective in a future. And the last but not least. This kind of transformation of transatlantic relations not only promotes the deepening of the relations among the EU and NATO countries, but also gives the possibility for the countries that are not members of these organizations to become an integral part of the global security system. And here it is really important to emphasize that of security and not of defense system, because the new level of transatlantic relations foresees the construction of relations that are based on mutual respect and trust, environment the framework of which are the human rights, and on the resolution of international disputes according to the principles of peaceful co-existence and non-use of force. For Ukraine these changes give an opportunity to achieve the higher level of relations both with NATO and EU countries. What benefits will be have from the cooperation with NATO? • The union with a Europe, security guarantees that will promote further democratization and development of Ukraine . And important factor in this situation is that with a view of new level of transatlantic relations, striving to become NATO member, Ukraine will not become an integral part of USA plan, but will achieve a status of partner with equal rights; And as it was stated by the first deputy to the Minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine Anton Buteyko, NATO – is a structure that survived confrontation of two systems. And we have to walk alongside of the winner, and not of the looser • Transatlantic relations – the Day After, Eberhard Sandschneider/ Thursday, August 14, 2003
UKRAINE - EU RELATIONS: THE PROGRESS MADE Oleksandr Svyetlov Abstract Introduction Common norms, values , political and socioeconomic standards The wish to join the West through membership in EU and NATO has become a common claim in many countries. `This dream implies to reach the security, prosperity and freedom of EU members but it is also a powerful initiative to treat ethnic minorities well, to respect international borders and international norms and to conduct their internal and external affairs peacefully` ( Hyde-Price i n Sio-Lopez, 1996: 272 ). “The Return to Europe” slogan is also crucial for Ukraine 's domestic policies. EU has `a historical opportunity to influence domestic policies and international relations in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe , contributing to European security and peace` (Hyde-Price i n Sio-Lopez , 1996: 211 ). European Union is primarily interested to develop an international system which is self-regulated by laws and norms, which should help in peaceful development of the international community through trans-national cooperation. This means that the EU policies for the promotion of democracy in Central and East Europe are part of a larger strategy aimed at permanent approximation on the European continent and at the improvement of friendly relationships with surrounding regions. Just as Verheugen emphasised, the debate on enlargement could ‘easily slip into pure practicalities', whereas in reality, enlargement was the way to ‘secure peace and security throughout Europe ' and there was ‘no alternative' (Verheugen, 2000). Over the years the Euroepean states came to share a number of norms which created a sense of common “Europeanness” and established the EU as a cooperative arrangement of democratic and peaceful states. The EU moved in the direction of international laws, rules, transnational cooperation and integration (Manners, 2002; Nicolaidis and Howse, 2002; Rosecrance, 1998; Smith, 1998; Duchene, 1972). Different types of Europeanization processes created a community based on liberal democratic collective identity (Fierkem and Wiener in Christensen, Jorgensen and Wiener , 2001; Olsen, 2002). As the norm community expands, the attractiveness of becoming part of the community increases (Finnmore and Sikkink 1998; Bjorkdahl 2002b). The European Security Strategy states that the EU has a task to promote a ring of well governed countries. EU membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities and a functioning market economy. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the `obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union` (Council of the European Union, 1993). The Copenhagen criteria for accession also highlighted the core norms of the EU, by laying emphasis on: 1. Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for, and protection of, minorities (political acquis); 2. The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union (economic acquis); 3. The ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (bureaucratic-institutional acquis). (Source: Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions: Copenhagen European Council, Brussels, 1993) Ukraine is tasked with first internalising EU “ common values “ by importing, internalising and implementing European norms before the EU adopts a decision on what to offer Ukraine. There are also certain conditions for norm import (Bjorkdahl 2002a). A norm may be imported if it fulfills certain criteria. The intrinsic characteristic of the norm is that it must be considered legitimate by the importing state. It needs to reflect widely shared values and reflect universality of rights and obligations prescribed. Finally, the norm is more likely to be adopted if it fits with the identity and the pre-existing normative structure of the importer, or if such a normative fit can be constructed (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Bjorkdahl 2002a: 62). There are both economic and political factors supporting the case for joining the EU club. Ukraine 's annual rate of economic growth since 2000 remained very high and 2004 GNP growth hit a 12% mark due to the intensification of trade relations with EU and USA . This year the growth rate is expected to lie at more than six per cent. The official position has long been openly pro-EU and NATO and public opinion polls showed an overwhelming support for membership in both institutions in spite of Ukraine?s regional differences in opinion; the Rada (Parliament) has also voted in support of Euro-Atlantic integration. The EU was and still is the second largest international donor (after USA ) and largest economic partner of Ukraine (in terms of trade and FDI). Thus over the period from 1991 to 2001 the total EC assistance amounted to ˆ 1,072 bln. Many neo-functionalists mention a powerful socialising role of the EU (Martin and Simmons, 1998). Sociological institutionalists regard the international system as a “cultural” and “institutional” environment structured by inter-subjective cognitions and norms (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein in Katzenstein, 1996: 33-75) . They view rationality as “constructed” or “context-bound” (Nee and Strang, 1998). Consequently, apart from geographic criteria, we can expect the EU to admit all countries that share its collective identity and adhere to its constitutive norms. EU requires its members to be democracies that respect the rule of law and human rights. New members must conform to the Community principles and acquis communautaire. The desire to join the European Union conforms to sociological expectations. In this perspective, the “return to Europe”, the dominant foreign policy goal of Ukraine , results from a strong identification with Western values and norms. EU membership would represent for Ukraine the indication of successful transformation into modern European country and recognition of it as being a part of European civilisation. The history of interaction Given the unpredictability of Russia , Ukraine has a clear interest in joining “Euro-Atlantic structures” (Checkel, 1999). Ukraine 's active involvement in NATO programmes signalled its commitment to join European security architecture and achieve full integration into Europe's economic, political and military structures, thus indicating strong commitment to Europe . By making progress in these areas Kyiv attempted to position itself as a European state displaying certain norms and values. Through participation in peace support operations Ukraine has also attempted to move closer to Europe by being seen as a committed and loyal member of the international community. Ukraine – NATO relations are relatively successful, although the Alliance also managed to exert some pressure on Kuchma (who by early 2002 began to clamp down on democracy in Ukraine ) by “going slow”. NATO membership may eventually serve as a backdoor for the entry to the EU, although it is not a sufficient guarantee (as depicted by the case of Turkey ). EU, on the other hand, was rather ignoring Ukraine from its very independence in 1991. Two factors explain this different approach by NATO and the EU. Firstly, the Russia n factor, an issue which is absent from the Western Balkans , whose future accession is not being questioned, and is only a matter of time . The situation was also due to the Ukrainian inner politics, although the role of Russia, which sees any attempt to advance the “European choice” of Ukraine as a direct threat, and the EU`s posture should not be fully disregarded. Zbigniew Brzezinski holds that Russia finds itself outside Europe without Ukraine , while Ukraine is much closer to Europe without Russia . Ukraine has a key significance for Russia , as security of Russian energy export channels depends on Ukraine , which also has the biggest Russian diaspora of some 12 million. Moscow believes that Ukraine 's integration into the EU would harm trade between Russia and Ukraine , which are each other's main trade partners. Secondly, the interrelated psychological problem of recognising fSU states, such as Ukraine as purely “ European ” . As far as the EU was concerned, however, during the ten years of Leonid Kuchma?s term in presidential office and European Union entertained what could be called quasi- virtual relations with Ukraine , which produced various misunderstandings and empty rhetoric on both sides. Ukraine explicitly stated its intention to become a member of the European Union in 1996. In the 1999 Common Strategy with Ukraine, the EU recognised Ukraine's “ European choice ” . But o ne year later Berlin and Paris ruled out Ukraine 's membership of the EU , thus paying more careful attention to the Russia n interests . On the other hand, Ukraine was largely to blame itself, as its foreign policy priorities in the past experienced frequent changes. Multi-vectorism was useful for Ukraine 's ruling elite at specific periods of time only. Thus Ukrainian policies displayed the following features: ambiguous foreign policy priorities (Kuchma used to declare, formally at least, strategic alliance with almost every country he visited , e.g. USA, Russia, Pakistan, India, China, political instability ( e.g. “ Kuchmagate”) , rather intensive cooperation with Russia, social policy deterioration, corrupt and unaccountable state authorities, and economic reforms, bogged down between the interests of oligarchs, clans and other rent-seekers. 1992 - The first EU-Ukraine top-level meeting. Meeting between the first President of Ukraine 1993 - Opening of the EC Commission Representation in Ukraine . 1994 - The Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation Between the EU and Ukraine is signed. 1995 - The Mission of Ukraine to the European Communities is established. 1997 - The first Ukraine-EU summit (Kyiv) approved Ukraine 's European choice. 1998 - Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between Ukraine and the EU comes into force. The Decree of the President of Ukraine approved the Strategy of Ukraine's integration to the EU. 1999 - Adoption of the EU Common Strategy on Ukraine on the EU Helsinki summit. 2004 - Adoption of a Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) between the European Community Member States and Ukraine was signed on 14 June 1994 and entered into force on 1 March 1998 . The Agreement provided a framework for political relations based on democratic values and dialogue. The PCA's provisions covered goods, services, labour, capital and domestic legislation of the Parties. The PCA was an important instrument in bringing Ukraine in line with the legal frameworks of the single European market and the GATT/WTO system. The PCA also contained a number of evolutionary clauses, including the prospect of a free trade area. Further, the agreement provided a framework for wide-ranging co-operation in commercial, industrial, scientific and administrative fields. The PCA highlights respect for shared fundamental values as an essential element of the EU-Ukraine relationship and supports Ukraine 's efforts towards democratic standards. The PCA established the following bilateral institutions, which met on average once a year: 1. the Cooperation Council met at Ministerial level. It had overall responsibility for the running of the PCA - including the political dialogue. Members were the representatives of the EU troika and the Ukrainian government; 2. the Cooperation Committee met at senior civil servants level. It was supported by sub-committees specialising in specific sectors and dealt with more technical issues; 3. the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee , which included the members of the European and Ukrainian Parliaments. In December 1999 the Helsinki European Council adopted the EU Common Strategy on Ukraine . The Common Strategy aims at developing a strategic partnership between the EU and Ukraine on the basis of the PCA, while acknowledging Ukraine 's European aspirations and welcoming the country's European choice. The strategy set three principal objectives: 1. to support the democratic and economic transition process in Ukraine ; 2. to meet common challenges on the European continent (stability and security in Europe , environment, energy and nuclear safety); 3. to strengthen co-operation between the EU and Ukraine in the context of enlargement (assisting Ukraine 's integration into the European and world economy, enhancing co-operation in the field of justice and home affairs). I n November 1999 Leonid Kuchma was re-elected on the explicitly pro-European platform. Yet, at that time Ukraine ?s democratisation processes were stagnating. This paradox of officially seeking EU membership while pursuing controversial domestic policies contributed to the rise of “ Ukraine fatigue “ in the late Kuchma era. One of the further reasons of Ukraine's failure of EU accession was Kyiv`s reluctance and self-criticism. In the face of economic hardship, Ukraine has always viewed EU membership as a very distant prospect, but Bulgaria and Romania , whose transition processes were similar, managed to gain much better results. On the other hand many Europeans were rather skeptical about the integration of a country that would be its largest member by geographic size and the fourth largest in terms of population. EU leaders were also careful about formulating a clear long-term position for Ukraine as they carefully watched political realities in Ukraine : the country's ongoing internal instability as well as the potential security risks engendered by weak authority. President Kuchma's work in office scored very low with Ukrainians, thus in 2002–2004 he rated just 3 to 3.2 points on a ten-point scale ( Ukrainian Society in 1994-2004: Sociological Monitoring, Kiev, 2004). There are many parallels between the hard-fought right of CEE countries to be accepted into the European camp and dynamics of Ukraine – EU relations. With regard to the enlargement timetable, one group of EU members (“drivers”) have advocated an early and firm commitment to Eastern enlargement, whereas other EU members (“brakemen”) have tried to slow down the process. The old member states were divided on this issue, with Germany and Britain advocating enlargement openly and France and Italy remaining reluctant. EU policy toward the CEE countries lacked commitment to enlargement and was stalling rather than pro-active (Mayhew, 1998 ; Torreblanca, 1997). It were the CEE governments that raised the issue of membership and constantly kept pushing the Community for an explicit commitment to this goal. The progress toward Eastern enlargement came in fact very incrementally. The same is valid for Ukraine , which has been pushing hard with rather few existing EU – proponents, such as Poland and Lithuania (due to cultural, historical, geographic, economic and political reasons). Top officials of Lithuania , Slovakia , Hungary and Poland have repeatedly declared Ukraine a foreign policy priority , using membership in the EU to integrate Ukraine into the West. The Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours (ENP) was presented in 2003 . In return for showing a commitment to “ common values ” and continued implementation of reforms, the new neighbours we re offered a “ stake in the EU's internal market ”, legislative approximation, energy and nuclear safety and the promotion of the four freedoms of movement (persons, goods, services and capital). The ENP's objective is to share the benefits of the EU's 2004 enlargement with neighbouring countries in terms of strengthening stability, security and well-being. It is officially marketed as preventing the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours, making possible their participation in various EU activities and better political, security, economic and cultural co-operation. The ENP offers a privileged relationship with neighbours, which will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development. With the ENP, which is distinct from potential membership, the EU aims to develop a zone of prosperity though the ring of close, peaceful and co-operative friends. Western CIS, Russia and the Southern Mediterranean are offered the prospect of further integration and liberalisation to free movement of persons, goods, services and capital . From the Ukrainian perspective, the Communication is an improvement on the PCA and amorphous Common Strategy. Ukraine has been offered `less than the Turkish perspective of membership ` , as was succinctly put by Romano Prodi in October 2003 in Yalta . Thus the lack of membership prospects reduce d the incentive to work towards the European common values. Moreover, the EU's policy towards enlargement and its neighbourhood policy have evoked frustration in Ukraine . Excluding Ukraine from European integration has strengthened anti-European and pro-Russian sentiments. As Kuchma said in April 2001, when he was openly criticized for Gongadze's disappearance and the tape scandal: `The fewer doors are open in Europe for Ukraine , the more Ukraine will cooperate with Russia `. At the EU-Ukraine summit, held on 8 July 2004 in the Hague , Leonid Kuchma said that the EU's neighborhood policy did not suit Ukraine 's interests. He refused to sign the prepared Action Plan for Ukraine within the policy's framework, arguing that he would not sign a document that brings no added value to EU-Ukraine relations. Instead he proposed to take time in order to improve the plan. The perception of Ukraine as a geographically European but culturally less so country is deep-rooted in Western Europe. Many EU states still perceive Ukraine as quasi-Soviet state, heavily dependent on Russia in both tangible and intangible resources. Ukraine is thought to have form ed their political culture s outside “ Europe ” ( with the exception of W estern Ukraine , which used to be a part of Austro-Hungarian state) . From the Russian perspective, Ukraine - due to ethnic (more than 50% of Ukrainians have relatives in Russia ) and historic ties - is a part of the Russian collective identity (Dergachev in Kempe and Kurth, 2004). Hence, Western policy towards Ukraine was derived from that towards Russia . EU member states were reluctant to risk relations with Russia by fully supporting Ukraine's “ European choice ” . Ukrainian officials have been even advised by some EU officials that membership would only occur together with Russia. The attempts to explain Ukraine – EU persisting distance in cultural terms, which were most vehemently advanced in Ukraine, namely that Ukraine is not Europe because of Homo Soveticus remnants largely remaining in place and Orthodoxy, can now be safely disposed of in the face of EU`s incorporation of the Baltic republics, as well as Bulgaria and Rumania. These two countries are claimed by many not to have experienced much of industrialisation and conversion from traditionalism. Ukraine , in contrast, was one of the most industrialised fSU republics, especially in its Central, Eastern and Southern parts. The fact that more than one third of total USSR military production was conducted in Ukraine may serve as indirect evidence. An independent Ukraine firmly anchored to the West is a guarantee against resurgent Russian Federation . The problem of distancing oneself from Russia has been and still is the key problem in the formation of Ukrainian identity. A high percentage of mixed marriages, about 12 million ethnic Russians, and the high level of cultural and linguistic “russification” of East and South Ukraine polarise the country ethno-culturally, economically and politically. The question of the status of Russian, which is spoken by at least half of the population, also remains a subject of bitter disputes, since this argument is about two mutually exclusive models of nation-building. Ukraine has espoused “ European choice ” rhetoric and the aim of integration into the EU while adopting domestic policies that undermine d these goals. The EU placed the onus of moving closer to its “ common values ” on Ukraine without making any offer of future membership. Ukraine has responded by demanding a decisive signal from the EU. But Kuchma's relative ambivalence towards EU membership from 2003 on had rather tactical than strategic importance – it was the continuation of his renowned multi-vector approach, a response to Europe?s criticism of his policies and could be explained by domestic factors, such as regional diversity, large number of Russian speakers, competing foreign orientations and economic dependency on Russia . Kuchma's presidency has also been convenient for the EU, because it has permitted to delay any decision on Ukraine and wait with any coherent strategy towards it. The lack of common serious strategy eventually led to contradictory statements by the EU on Ukraine. Thus Commission President Romano Prodi in the interview to Die Volkskrant in November 200 3 ruled out Ukraine as the EU member : ` The fact that Ukrainians or Armenians feel European means nothing to me ` . Three years earlier, however, Prodi was positive on Ukraine `s membership. ( Interfax, 18 March 2003 ) . The EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana said at the Warsaw conference in October 2002 that Ukraine is not playing by the rules but playing with the rules. Further, during the conference in Athens in April 2003, President Jacques Chirac said that France would support upgrading Ukraine 's status to associate member. EU Enlargement Commissioner Gunter Verheugen's views have evolved towards a more “open-door” view: 'it is true that the door cannot remain closed in the long term' (Lobjakas, 2003). Such constant changing of views reflect ed a lack of any consistent EU strategy towards Ukraine. A joint German-French report drawn up by their respective foreign ministries in 2000 emphasised that Ukraine could not be allowed to become a member of the EU , as Ukraine' s admission would imply Russia `s isolation. The then Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk, complained that the EU was 'politically indecisive and contradictory' , deal ing with Ukraine at the level of 'nice declarations only… u ntil now I have not heard a comprehensive explanation from the EU as to what criteria it applies to the countries that aspire to become its members: geographic, economic or political. It is only when things really hurt that the Europeans are ready to make political decisions that should have been made many years ago. As long as nothing dangerous happens in Ukraine, nobody pays attention to it ` ( Financial Times, 10 October 2003 ) . In response, during the 2004 presidential election campaign in Ukraine the state- and pro-oligarch mass media in Ukraine aimed to create a very unattractive image of the EU in the eyes of Ukrainian electorate. It focused extensively on legal violations, corruption and other imperfections in Europe . It also reported widely on negative impacts of accession on new member states in the EU and on Euro-skepticism across the EU. Additionally, various anti-EU guidelines for journalists were issued by the President's office. As a result Ukrainians received rather negative information about the EU. (NAS of Ukraine , 2004). Further, the analysis of some TV content showed, that the thesis that Yushchenko represented the interests of the West has been widely exploited. They claimed that Yushchenko as a possible president would turn voters from Eastern Ukraine into second-class citizens. (Solonenko in Kempe and Kurth, 2004). Recent developments The victory of Yushchenko transformed Ukraine 's “European choice” rhetoric from virtual declarations into real policy. In January 2005 President Victor Yushchenko declared, that Ukraine is keen to apply for EU membership in the near future. The Ukrainian authorities earlier declared, that hope to finish negotiations with the European Union about the conclusion of the agreement the status of associated member till 2007. Yushchenko also predicted Ukraine?s accession into EU before 2016, but the EU is still rather cautious concerning Kyiv?s plans, preferring to go slow in this matte, seeing it as a geographical outsider residing on Europe 's outskirts. On the other hand there emerged new opportunities for enlarged Europe and Ukraine . T he time has come to adopt a new, more productive approach - to view Ukraine as a regional geopolitical pivot state , security provider and economic asset. Trade issues are also a significant element in EU-Ukraine relations. A key focus is on negotiations for Ukraine 's accession to the WTO. The Commission is currently assessing the Ukrainian request to be given the market economy status. What Bronislav Geremek, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs meant in 1998 for Poland , may illustrate the spectrum of current Ukrainian interests: `We will turn to the West and to its institutions keeping in mind at least these four objectives. First, to strengthen ourselves internationally; second, to introduce a new sensibility and a different historical experience in the Western European Debate; third, to strengthen NATO and the EU, not only to add our potential to their strength but to offer new points of view and new challenges and, four, to reinforce and accelerate the process of democratic reconstruction in the region and to build a new European order` (Geremek, 1998). On the occasion of the inauguration of the new president of Ukraine the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner wrote: ` Recent events have shown the extent of your commitment to the democratic values on which Europe is based. Even before these events the EU was intending to upgrade its relations with Ukraine , but now it is clear that our relations have taken on a new resonance and that we may be able to move more quickly than we previously thought possible` (Day, 22 January 2005 ). Critics of the status quo view integration into NATO and EU as a powerful vehicle for domestic change. The influence of EU on s tates? domestic reforms should not be underestimated . The EU's merit-based rules for membership allowed EU leverage to influence domestic politics in CEE candidate countries. The incentive of joining attractive international institutions compels potential members to take steps towards economic reform s and consolidation of democracy. EU offers great benefits of membership through insist ing on extensive requirements, and therefore exercises enormous potential leverage on the domestic politics of likely member states. The future will show how far EU and Ukraine were ready to go in this context. EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana on the occasion of Yushchenko`s inauguration as the new president wrote the following: `the future quality of our relations will largely depend on the quality of Ukraine's democracy and domestic reforms. We are now moving forward with a comprehensive package of measures to give substance to our desire for deeper co-operation (the so-called EU-Ukraine Action Plan). This will herald a qualitatively new phase in our relationship. This plan is ambitious and tailored specially for Ukraine . It can be implemented progressively and flexibly, with the speed depending on the success of Ukraine 's own reforms and her political will. For example, the action plan offers Ukraine , in principle, complete access to the EU's single market – the world's largest collection of affluent customers. Under the plan, Ukraine will also able to associate itself with the EU's rapidly developing foreign and security policies` (Weekly Mirror, 22 January 2005 ). A survey conducted in six largest countries of the European Union in March 2005 has shown, that 55 % of Europeans would like to see Ukraine within the European Union. Such results look especially surprising if we compare sympathies of top European officials to Turkey : only 45 % of those surveyed expressed their support to the Turkey 's future as an EU member country in spite of the fact that Turkey proceeded much further in its “European career” than Ukraine . Numerous debates are being conducted about membership of Ukraine in EU, but at the moment very few politicians in the West, given a plethora of economic, etc. problems, expressed interest in concrete opinion of citizens of the European countries. And this survey results may serve as a good indication for European politicians, who are otherwise often accused of being deaf to their electorate's concerns about the EU enlargement. It is also a pleasant surprise to the new Ukrainian political elite longing for Europe without borders. Its results should also guide future action. The poll was conducted by TNS Sofres on behalf of the Yes-Campaign with a purpose to study public opinion on future European borders in France , Germany , Great Britain , Italy , Poland and Spain . Some 6 thousand respondents gave their responses. Sympathies of Europeans were distributed unevenly, depending on the country. So, in Poland 77 % were in favour of Ukraine?s accession into EU and 12 % were against. 49 % questioned in the Great Britain supported Ukraine?s membership in the EU and 27 % were against. The French in their majority were positive (58 % - for, 37 % - against). But the majority of Germans was pessimistic (53 % - against, 41 % - for). These poll results stood, by the way, in stark contrast to the possible EU membership of Turkey . Thus 59 % of surveyed French were against and only 37 % in favour future Turkish membership. Very similar opinion was expressed by Germans: 60 % were against and 36 % in favour. Half of polled English supported Turkey and 32 % were against. Only Poles in their majority (55 %) supported Turkey?s European aspirations. ( Êîððåñïîíäåíò .net, 14:20 , 24 March 2005 ). This fact can be explained by Warsaw?s official logic towards Ukrainian future within Europe . In view of Polish politicians Turkey should not be discriminated upon, and that will eventually increase Ukraine?s chances for a fully fledged membership. These rather optimistic for Ukraine results are surprising for a country which is rather unknown in Europe . Negative connotations used to dominate Europe?s public opinion, these used to be Chernobyl , communist rule, corruption and illegal migration. Few of positive but largerly unknown facts were: Ukraine as Europe?s breadbasket, the anti-Soviet partisan movement, which held till mid-1950s, and unemployment rate well below that of most of its neighbours. In May 2005 for instance the official rate of unemployment went down to 3,3 %. According to the estimates of the State Committee of Statistics, in June there were 945 thousand unemployed registered with the Public Employment Office. The greatest rate of unemployment for 1 June 2005 has been registered in Ternopil (7,0 %), and the lowest in Kyiv (0,4 %), Sevastopol (0,7 %) and the Odesa area (2,0 %) ( Êîððåñïîíäåíò .net, 14 June 2005 ). In lieu of conclusion The case of Ukraine at this moment offers a unique opportunity of transformation from what comprised the worst of the post-Soviet history into a promising new “star” on the European horizon. Due to the Orange Revolution, Ukraine may be described a newly born democracy with great potential, which can effectively build on the basis of first stage transformation from 1991 (declaration of independence up through “Kuchma era”). The Orange Revolution constitutes the beginning of a second stage of post-communist transformation. From sluggishness, kleptocracy, state capitalism the country transforms into transparent, accountable and stable democracy. The example of Ukraine also constitutes a precedent for a wider region (immediate vicinity: Belarus , Moldova , Russia ), but also Central Asia ( Kyrgyzstan , Kazakhstan , Uzbekistan , etc). Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union clearly allows any geographically based European state to apply for membership. On 15 March 2001 the European Parliament formally supported Ukraine's future membership . The future of Ukraine lies in the hands of Ukrainians themselves. And that is even more so, taking into consideration the events and outcomes of the Orange Revolution. However the European Community should provide active support to the strengthening of European aspirations in Ukraine . The EU has already begun discussion of mitigation of visa requirements with Ukraine , creation of free trade zone, and depending on outcomes, associative membership in not so distant future in spite of two recent no-votes in France and the Netherlands . Ukraine must do its homework and thoroughly prepare for full EU compliance. But in order to do that, the EU must offer some prospects of membership in the nearest foreseeable future. In line with its strategic goal of further European integration, Ukraine will continue its internal reforms based on strengthening democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, the principle of separation of powers and judicial independence. With a new Western-orientated government in Kyiv, there is a need to seriously reassess a potential Ukrainian membership. Ukraine should press for fast reforms and use the “honeymoon” period to open negotiations for EU membership. This will help prevent state recapture by elites and blocking of progress. The peaceful and cooperative history of Ukraine 's post-Soviet transition and recent events of the Orange Revolution proved that Ukraine may be considered a part of larger European community of values, and full EU membership is merely a formal acknowledgement of it, a technicality. Unilateral introduction by Ukraine of visa-free regime for the EU citizens in May 2005 serves as a good start for further progress. The 1986 Accession negotiations with Portugal and Spain lasted for almost ten years and the 2004 Enlargement for some countries took almost fifteen years. Bearing that in mind, Ukraine should not get disappointed by eventual difficulties and seeming setbacks of its “Return to Europe ” project.
ENERGY SECURITY AS THE REQUISITE CONDITION OF THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMICS' RESTRUCTURING Katerina Peresada The modern development of economic relations is determined by the degree of country's integration into the world economy, with the self-sufficiency of its own economy, with the economic and social policy that provide the respective role of the state in the world economic space. The transformational processes in Ukraine were initially aimed at the strengthening of market economy principles, forming of the efficient methods for securing economic independence. That is why the participation of Ukraine in either international organization must be considered to be not as an end in itself, but as an instrument for implementation of economic transformation directed towards the leaders of European Economic Community. None of the national economies today can exist without the relations with other national economies and the world economy. That is why they are very vulnerable. Examples of the whole autonomy in the modern world are very rare. Even North Korea , for example, was given support by the Korea Republic and China at the period of bad harvest and starvation in the end of the 90s. We can't consider it to be fully self-sufficient. Thus, only an entirely autarkic state can be secure against economic attacks. Such an economy would be very poor. In fact all the economies today are very unsafe and vulnerable, because of their dependence on each other (the situation with rise in prices for oil and gas). At the same time it is openness, flexibility and ability for reacting that allows countries to survive. Autarkic economy can be destroyed even with the lean year. Deciding the issues concerning the security of national interests is based upon national security. The key component of it is economic safety. It means protectability of the national economy from the internal and external threat and its ability for the extended reproduction [1, p.18]. One direction of the economic security is a resource security. The resources possession is one of the most important factors affecting stability and security of the state development. Lack or partial resource provision leads to the considerable damages in the economy and to the decision-making that is not in the interest of the state and threatens its sovereignty and nationality. Partial resource provision doesn't permit Ukraine to integrate into the world community. Energy security is a subvariety of resource security, that is determined with provision of the sufficient amount of energy supply. By the energy security of Ukraine we imply an ability of the state to provide an efficient use supply-demand balance, to accomplish an optimal diversity of the energy carrier sources and delivery tracks in order to provide vital activity of the national economy during the normal state and the state of emergency, to prevent the acute instability of prices for energy resources or to create conditions for smooth adaptation of the national economy to new prices. The development of economy, urbanization and rising of life's mobility predetermine an increase of mankind needs in energy supply. According to the forecasts of OPEC the world energy consumption in year 2020 will increase per 55%. At the same time the oil and gas sources are accumulated slower then consuming. There have been explored 140 bn tons of oil in the world, while annually consumption is 3 bn tons. Increase of oil resources in the middle 90 th was 0,8%, while output was more than 2%. This is an evidence of the resource exhausting by the year 2050 [2]. Strategically important resources for Ukraine are oil and gas, which are energy components for the economic security. The limitation of own energy carriers makes the state dependent on the outside deliveries. This influences not only the economic, but also the politic stability. Oil, gas and industries coherent to them play a crucial role while providing national development of Ukraine because it is one of the most power-consuming state of the world. It's share in the world electric power intake is 1,9%, while the population is approximately 1% of the world population. Problems, concerning the lack of energy sources are accentuated by following facts: • limitation of explored deposits; To operate effectively Ukrainian economy needs 25-30 mn tons of oil and 70-75 bn m 3 of gas per year. The owing output is 3.5 mn tons of oil and 18-20 bn m 3 of gas per year. According to the preliminary forecasts the output volumes of oil and gas in Ukraine will flatten out at the rate of 5 mn tons and 26 bn m 3 thereafter [4, p.21]. The procurement of own resources in Ukraine is 11-12% (oil) and 16-18% (gas). This situation permits Russian oil TNC in the first quarter of 2005 to apply a price dictatorship in the oil products market and to increase the fuel price. Consequently fuel deliveries were suspended and business depression in the whole economy was activated. The aspect of energy depending also showed itself through the Russian gas prices' increasing in the December 2005 – January 2006. The dependence upon natural gas imports was the main reason for Ukraine 's trade deficit since independence. Being imported from Russia at an official price of 80 USD/1,000 m 3 , gas was the single most expensive imported commodity, representing about 25% of total imports. The today's price is 95 USD/1000 m 3 is a real test for Ukraine . The industry spends 1,65 kg of a standard coal per 1UAH of GDP. This is 2-5 times more than market-economy countries do. The price spiral spinup in the energy sector is the main reason for inflation's growth. The Rate Of Inflation (ROI) in the year 2005 came to ca.10,3% [5]. The boundary value of the ROI per year in odder to provide the economic security mustn't exceed 5%. Ukrainian economy depends on Russian at about 90% with oil delivery and 60% with gas delivery. To be provided with energy security the delivery of one energy carrier from one supplier mustn't exceed 30% [3, p.21]. This is required to let the country develop its economy as an independent one. Ukrainian requirements of gas are also satisfied with the deliveries from Turkmenistan . But they are accomplished through the territory of Russia . That is why stability and economic practicability of these deliveries are also depended on the relationships with Russia . Diversity of gas delivery projects from Iran , Norway and Azerbaijan are almost impossible for Ukraine today because of their high value. And oil delivery projects are complicated with technological peculiarities of manufacturing industry technologies, as the whole Ukrainian industry are adapted to the Russian oil, the structure of which is quite different from the Iranian oil The prime lines of the Ukrainian oil-gas sector development at the regional and international level should be the following: • energy intensity reduction of the economy with the help of cutting down the consumption of initial energy supply by the links of economic system; The current state of the Ukrainian industry doesn't permit to produce competitive products. Obsolete equipment and technologies lead to exceeding of the GDP energy intensity. Deterioration degree of the basic funds of industry grows from year to year (year 1998-47,7%, 2003-53,2% from the whole funds' value at the end of year). The deterioration degree in some industries reaches even 60-70% (chemical, metallurgical industries). At the same time the implementation of alternative technologies in year 2003 became 4 times less than in 1991. Gas transportation system and underground gas storages are also strategic objects of the Ukrainian oil-gas industry. Gas transportation system consists of 37,5 thousands km pipelines, 71 compressor stations and 13 underground gas storages with general active storage capacity 32 bn m 3 . From the geographical point of view, Ukraine is disposed between demand and supply. Capacity of the gas pipelines system is 288 bn m 3 per year at the input and 175 bn m 3 at the output, including the 140 bn m 3 Russian gas transported into the European countries. For these activity Russian party pay many times less than European countries do (1,6 USD per 1 thousand m 3 - transit services; 2,26 USD per 1 thousand m 3 – storage services) [6]. Energy resources delivery and transit relationships between Russia and Ukraine are also hampered by the attempts of the Russian party to possess strategic objects of oil-gas infrastructure by force of privatization or compensation for the debts, which arose due to energy sources import. These processes influence energy security greatly. The absence of control and economic instruments in the oil-gas industry will lead to the disability of the country to fulfill tactical and strategic planning toward national interests security. The current state of the Ukrainian economy conditions the necessity of its economy integration into the world economy. The main causes are: • importance of technological rate increasing (energy intensity and material capacity of national income is 1,5-2 times as many as in market-economy countries); But it is important to take into account the peculiarities of Ukrainian integration: • Ukrainian economy is a former part of the USSR economy (that is the reason for economy deficiency and attachment to the economic of the former Soviet republics; it is harmful to tear these connections in a sharp way); One of the ways to solve the problems on the path to integration is to participate in the international organizations. This needs to be done on the basis of a composite in-depth analysis in context of Rassia-NATO-Ukraine relationships. Ukrainian economy is very vulnerable because of energy dependence. This dependence can be used by any country. Russian politicians consider that it is the very energy depending which can be used in odder to change the vector of Ukrainian integration process in the for Russia desirable way [7]. It is impossible for Ukraine today to reach oil-gas price level that is appropriate for the NATO member states. Energy resources determine the necessity of integration into the world economy and disability to make it toward European community at the same time. Thus, conditions of the Ukrainian integration must be well-defined in odder not to destroy the depressed Ukrainian economy. The Ukraine energy security problems have become a catalyst for the same discussion in Europe . Economic, energy and ecological security in the Baltic countries of the 21 st century are understood as independence on Russia . The official standing of these, in most cases transient, countries is “Security from Russia ”. They are still claim to monopolize transit of the Russian energy resources to the West, but aim to reduce the economic dependence on Russia . To tie Russia toward their economic, but not to depend on it themselves – this is the formula of “new colonialism”. According to the results of the pooling that was made by the Ukrainian center of economic and political researches named by A.Razumkov the main problems, that must be solved before the entry into NATO, are the following: • economic problems (50,5% of all questioned people); The reason of Ukrainian disability to maintain the national defense and defense establishment is not the army, but the Ukrainian economy. Hence the very process of approaching to the values of the alliance is urgent for Ukraine . The prerequisites for this are restructuring of the Ukrainian economy and the energy security strengthening. References 1. Æàë³ëî ß.À. Åêîíîì³÷íà áåçïåêà – ñïðàâà âñ³õ ³ êîæíîãî // Óðÿäîâèé êóóð¿ºð. 13 ñåðïíÿ 1998, ¹154-155, ñ.18
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